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STANDING UNDER SECTION 14(e) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934:
MAY A TENDER OFFEROR SUE FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF?
I. Introduction
Within the last ten to fifteen years, the cash tender offer has
become a common device for gaining control of a publicly held
corporation.' Generally, a cash tender offer is recognized as a public
offer made to shareholders of the company sought to be controlled
to purchase stock at a set price over a period of time.' To induce
shareholders to tender their stock, the price set by the offeror is
1. Between 1972 and 1975, over 100 offers were registered each year with the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Rattner, States Acting to Put Curb on Takeovers, N.Y. Times,
July 6, 1976, at 41, col. 8. According to the SEC, the number of filings under the Williams
Act (see note 8 infra) were: 111 in 1974; 93 in 1975; 126 in 1976. E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN &
G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL vi (1977). Contrast
these figures with the fact that in 1960 only eight tender offers involved corporations with
securities listed on the national securities exchanges. E. ARANow & H. EINHORN, TENDER
OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 65 n. 3 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ARANow & EINHORN].
Some of the reasons suggested for the increased use of the tender offer device are:
(1) increased corporate liquidity and readily available credit; (2) comparatively de-
pressed price/earnings ratios, book values, and cash or quick assets ratios, making
acquisition via the tender offer more attractive; (3) greater recognition, sophistication,
and knowledge with respect to the takeover via the tender offer technique; (4) lack of
extensive federal or state regulation of tender offers; (5) quicker and more successful
results when compared with a full-dress proxy contest; (6) greater flexibility - the
ability to hedge by reserving certain options against a final and irrevocable commit-
ment; (7) psychology - the appeal to shareholders in straight dollars and cents lan-
guage, eliminating the need, as in a proxy contest, to convince the shareholder that
the insurgent can do a more efficient job; (8) notwithstanding the actual capital invest-
ment, the reduced costs of effecting a tender offer when compared with a proxy contest;
(9) a new 'respectability' for cash tender offers.
Id. at 65-66.
2. See Fleisher & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisitions By Tender Offers, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
317 (1967); Note' Standing To Sue Under 14(e), 26 KANSAS L. REV. 624 (1978). The term
"tender offer" is not defined specifically in the Williams Act. Scholars believe that the failure
of Congress and the SEC to define the term "tender offer" was not an oversight. Rather, they
feel that the legislature did not define the term in order to allow the courts and the SEC to
make case by case determinations. See ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 69-70. The
parameters of the term "tender offer" as it is used in the Williams Act have been the subject
of much discussion. See, e.g., Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1251 (1973). This subject, however,
is beyond the scope of this article.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
higher than the current market price of the stock. In a tender offer,
the offeror specifies the minimum total number of shares which
must be tendered by a certain date.' If the minimum number of
shares is tendered, the offeror will purchase the shares and thereby
gain control of the corporation. If the minimum number of shares
is not tendered, however, the offeror need not purchase any of the
stock.
The cash tender offer is an attractive means-of gaining control of
a corporation because it costs less and consumes less time than
other acquisition devices such as negotiated mergers, gradual mar-
ket acquisition, and proxy contests.' In addition, the cash tender
offeror, unlike the exchange tender offeror,' need not convince the
shareholder that he would do a better job of managing the corpora-
tion than the incumbent.' Thus, the tender offer device, in contrast
to the open market method of gaining control, substantially de-
creases the risk that an offeror will have its assets tied up in a
corporation in which it cannot gain a controlling share of stock.
As the use of the cash tender offer device increased, so did the
amount of abuse. In an effort to eliminate abuse,' Congress enacted
the Williams Act' in 1968 as an amendment to the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.1 The Williams Act regulates tender offers by
mandating disclosure of the tender offeror's identity and intent,'"
regulating the offeror's acceptance of shares tendered," and prohib-
iting any fraudulent activity in connection with a tender offer. The
3. The minimum number specified will be the number of shares of stock needed to gain
control of the corporation.
4. Wilner & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and Their Constitution-
ality, 45 FORPHAM L. REV. 1 (1976). For an example of the great expense involved in waging
a proxy contest, see Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128
N.E.2d 291, 51 A.L.R. 2d 860 (1955).
5. In an exchange tender offer, the offeror issues either its common or preferred stock,
convertible or nonconvertible subordinated debentures, bonds, warrants, or some combina-
tion thereof. ARANOW & EINHORN, supra note 1, at 29.
6. Id. at 29-30.
7. See H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968); S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess. 3 (1967).
8. Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 m(d)-
78m(e), 78n(d)-78n(f) (1976)).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(1)-78n(d)(4) (1976).
11. Id. §§ 78n(d)(5)-78n(d)(8).
12. Id. § 78n(e).
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prohibition against fraudulent activity is contained in section 14(e),
which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or omit to state any material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they are
made, not misleading, or to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipu-
lative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or
invitation for tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to
or in favor of any such offer, request, or invitation. 3
It is not uncommon for the management of the corporation sought
to be taken over (referred to hereinafter as the "target" corporation)
to actively resist the takeover attempt. 4 To combat the takeover
attempt, the target management can advise its shareholders not to
tender their stock. Alternatively, target management may suggest
to a third company, commonly referred to as the "white knight," to
make a competing tender offer. 5
The white knight, as a tender offeror, is likewise subject to the
anti-fraud provisions of section 14(e).11 Fraudulent assertions by the
white knight could induce the shareholders of the target to tender
their stock to the white knight rather than to the original tender
offeror. The original tender offeror is thereby wrongly frustrated in
his quest to gain control. Notwithstanding this injury, the United
States Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft, Inc. v. Chris-Craft Indus-
tries, Inc. 17 held that a tender offeror does not have standing under
section 14(e) to sue for damages. This Note will review Piper and
address the issue of whether a tender offeror has standing to sue for
injunctive relief under section 14(e). However, before the standing
issue can be fully discussed, a brief review of the Williams Act and
13. Id.
14. The target management may have some valid reasons for resisting the takeover. For
instance, the target may believe in good faith that a takeover would not be in the best
interests of its shareholders. However, the target management may have some improper
reasons for resisting the takeover. In such cases where the management has purposely or
negligently misled its shareholders, it appears that the shareholders can bring suit against
management under section 14(e). See note 81 infra and the accompanying text.
15. If the shareholders already have tendered the minimum number of shares requested
by the offeror, the management, in a last effort to resist the takeover, may sell a block of
authorized but unissued shares to a white knight for the purpose of diminishing the offeror's
interest.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976).
17. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
1980]
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its niche in the overall plan of federal securities legislation is essen-
tial.
II. History of the Williams Act
Congress enacted major securities legislation in 1933 and 1934 to
restore the faith of Americans in the United States economy after
the Great Depression. The Securities Act of 193311 regulates the
offering of securities to the public.'" The act is designed to provide
investors with material information, financial and otherwise, re-
garding securities offered for public sale, and to prohibit all misre-
presentation, deceit and fraud connected with the sale of securi-
ties.'" The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,2 enacted to expand
investor protection, regulates trading in securities already issued
and outstanding. The 1934 Act, among other things, imposes dis-
closure requirements on publicly-held corporations,23 prohibits
"manipulative or deceptive devices or contrivances" associated with
the sale or purchase of securities, 4 limits the amount of credit which
may be extended for purchase of securities," and provides for regis-
tration and supervision of national securities exchanges. 6
Prior to the passage of the Williams Act, those seeking to gain
control of a company by offering an exchange of stock or by proxy
contest were required to disclose certain information. Those at-
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1976).
19. The securities laws distinguish between the original issuance of shares and the subse-
quent trading of those shares. The Securities Act of 1933 regulates the issuance of shares; the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 applies to the subsequent transactions.
20. The first purpose is effectuated by requiring the issuer of securities offered for public
sale to file a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77e (1976). The registration statement, including the prospectus, becomes public informa-
tion immediately upon filing with the Commission. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, j(1976).
21. Id. § 78.
22. See note 19 supra.
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(b), 781(j), 78m(a), 7Sm(b) (1976).
24. Id. 88 78i, 78j.
25. Id. §§ 78g, 78h.
26. Id. 88 78k, 78kA, 781(k),78q.
27. Where one who seeks control of a corporation makes an exchange offer of stock
to obtain control, the offer must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933. [§ 51.
The shareholder gets a prospectus explaining all material facts about the offer. He
knows who the purchaser is, and what plans have been made for the company. He is
in a position to make an informed decision either to hold his original security or to
exchange it for another. Similarly, where control is sought through a proxy contest,
information must be filed under the Securities Exchange Act [§ 14(a)] which tells
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tempting a takeover by means of the cash tender offer device, how-
ever, were not required to reveal any information. The Williams Act
attempts to rectify this anomaly by requiring all tender offerors,
including cash tender offerors, to disclose information similar to
that required of exchange tender offerors and proxy contestants."
The bill is not intended to favor the offeror or the target manage-
ment;2 rather, its purpose is to protect the investor.'" Senator Har-
rison A. Williams, Jr., the sponsor of the bill introduced the legis-
lation by stating: "This legislation will close a significant gap in
investor protection under the federal securities laws by requiring the
disclosure of pertinent information to stockholders when persons
seek to obtain control of a corporation by a cash tender offer or
through open market or privately negotiated purchases of securi-
ties." The Senate" and House33 Reports on the Williams Act re-
flected similar sentiment.
In addition to imposing a duty on a tender offeror to disclose
material information, the Williams Act expanded the class of share-
holders protected under the securities laws. Prior to the passage of
shareholders the identity of the participants and their associates, their stockholdings
and when they acquired them, the extent to which the shares were purchased with
borrowed funds and the identity of the lender if the funds were obtained otherwise than
through a bank loan or margin account. Additionally, details as to any arrangements
made regarding employment by, or other future transactions with, the issuer must be
given. In both the exchange offer and the proxy fight the disclosures made are filed
with the Commission and are subject to statutory requirements and sanctions.
113 CONG. REc. 854, 855 (1967).
28. Under § 14(d) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act (enacted as part of the Williams
Act), no person may make a tender offer which would result in his owning greater than 5% of
a class of securities registered under § 12 of the 1934 Act unless he has filed with the SEC,
and gives to each offeree, a statement containing certain of the information required under §
13(d) of the 1934 Act. Section 13(d) requires any person who becomes the owner of more than
5% of any class of securities registered under § 12 to file with the issuer of the securities and
with the SEC a statement setting forth (1) the background of such person, (2) the source of
the funds used for such acquisition, (3) the purpose of the acquisition, (4) the number of
shares owned, and (5) any relevant contracts, arrangements or understandings.
29, S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
30. "The purpose of the Williams Act is to insure that public shareholders who are con-
fronted by a cash tender offer for their stock will not be required to respond without adequate
information regarding the qualifications and intentions of the offering party." Rondeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975).
31. 113 CONG. REC. 854 (1967) (emphasis added).
32. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
33. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
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the Williams Act, a party defrauded in connection with a tender
offer had to seek relief under rule 10b-5.34 Rule 10b-5 prohibits any
fraudulent activity connected with the purchase or sale of securi-
ties. 5 Because rule 10b-5 contains a "purchaser-seller" requirement,
shareholders who did not tender shares or whose shares were not
purchased did not have causes of action under the federal securities
statutes." Section 14(e) is virtually identical to rule 10b-5, except
that section 14(e) does not contain a purchaser-seller requirement.37
34. Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1979), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or,
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
Rule lOb-5 was promulgated under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j
(1976), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national exchange .. .(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so
registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropri-
ate in the public interest or for protection of investors.
35. See note 34 supra.
36. In Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
956 (1952), the court limited causes of action under rule 10b-5 to purchasers or sellers of the
security in question. The Supreme Court affirmed the Birnbaum rule in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), when it held that a private cause of action did
not lie under rule lob-5 in favor of potential purchasers who alleged that an overly pessimistic
assessment by management discouraged them from exercising their options to purchase.
Later, the Supreme Court denied standing under rule 10b-5 to customers of a brokerage firm
who claimed that the brokerage firm's auditors issued misleading statements regarding an
insolvent corporation in which the customer had invested. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976). The Court in Santa Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), held that
shareholders "frozen out" under Delaware's "short form" merger statute did not have stand-
ing under rule 10b-5.
37. See Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (D. Me. 1971). "The
legislative history . . . and the similarity between the substantive provisions of Section 14(e)
and Rule 10b-5 make clear that the intent of Congress in enacting Section 14(e) was to make
available to those defrauded in connection with tender offers the full arsenal of remedies
available under Section 10(b) and its implementing Rule lOb-5 to those defrauded in connec-
tion with purchases or sales of securities." Id. at 913-14 (citations omitted). Like section 14(e),
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It has been argued therefore that section 14(e) provides defrauded
shareholders, including non-sellers and non-purchasers, with a fed-
eral cause of action. 8 This argument is consistent with the express
purpose of the Williams Act to protect the investors. Controversy
develops where parties other than shareholders seek standing to sue
under section 14(e).
III. Standing to Sue for Damages: Piper v. Chris-Craft
In Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.,39 Chris-Craft, seeking to
gain control of Piper Aircraft Corporation, began to make cash pur-
chases of Piper stock on the open market in December 1968. In
January 1969, Chris-Craft publicly announced a cash tender offer
for up to 300,000 Piper shares.40 Despite resistance from Piper man-
agement,4 Chris-Craft acquired over 300,000 shares of Piper by the
time its cash tender offer expired in early February. In an effort to
obtain the balance of stock needed to gain control of Piper, Chris-
Craft made an exchange offer to the Piper shareholders.4" In March,
Piper, attempting to avoid a takeover by Chris-Craft, began negoti-
ating an exchange of stock agreement with Bangor Punta Corpora-
tion.43 On May 8, the Piper family agreed to trade its thirty-one
percent ownership in Piper Aircraft to Bangor. In exchange, Bangor
agreed to trade a portion of its securities and promised to use its best
efforts to acquire a controlling interest in Piper. Accompanying the
section 10(b) does not provide for a private cause of action against those who violate section
10(b) and the rule promulgated under it. However, the United States Supreme Court has held
that a private cause of action for damages may be implied under rule 10b-5 in Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971). The relationship between section 14(e)
and rule 10b-5 has been well documented. See, e.g., Note, A Proposal for Affirmative Disclo-
sure by Target Management During Tender Offers, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 201 n. 71 (1975).
38. See, e.g., Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975); H.K. Porter Co. v.
Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973). See note 102 infra and text accompanying
notes 97-101 infra.
39. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
40. Id. at 5. Chris-Craft made an offer to purchase Piper stock at a price $12.00 above
the current market value of the stock.
41. Management sent letters to the shareholders advising them not to tender their shares.
In addition, Piper entered into an agreement with Grumman Aircraft Corp. in which Grum-
man was to purchase 300,000 authorized but unissued shares of Piper. This agreement,
however, never was carried out. Id.
42, Id. at 6. For the definition of an exchange offer, see note 5 supra.
43. Id. at 6-7. According to Bangor's underwriter, First Boston Corporation, the value of
the securities involved in the exchange offer was at least $80 per share of Piper.
19801
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announcement of the agreement between Piper and Bangor was
news that Bangor intended to make an exchange of stock offer to
Piper shareholders. Bangor also announced that its underwriter as-
sessed the value of the securities offered by Bangor at a price signifi-
cantly higher than the value of shares offered by Chris-Craft." After
Bangor made three privately negotiated purchases from large insti-
tutional investors,45 the takeover contest between Chris-Craft and
Bangor focused on the competing exchange offers.4" In September,
Bangor finally acquired a controlling interest in Piper Aircraft."
Litigation concerning the takeover began long before Bangor
gained control of Piper Aircraft. On May 22, 1969, Chris-Craft filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York alleging that Bangor had violated, inter alia, section 14(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, rule 10b-5, and rule 10b-6.4
Chris-Craft sought to temporarily enjoin Bangor from voting the
shares it acquired in the three negotiated purchases and from ac-
cepting any shares tendered by Piper shareholders pursuant to the
exchange offer.49 The district court denied Chris-Craft's prayer for
a preliminary injunction. 0 This holding was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.5' The court of appeals remanded
the case to allow Bangor the opportunity to demonstrate that the
negotiated purchases it made while awaiting the effective date of its
exchange offer fell within an exception to rule 10b-6.12
On remand, Chris-Craft abandoned its request for a preliminary
44. Id. at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 8.
47. On September 5, 1969, Bangor held over 50% of Piper's outstanding stock and Chris-
Craft held 42%. Id. at 9.
48. Section 14(e) is set forth in the text accompanying note 13 supra; rule 10b-5 is set forth
in note 34 supra. Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-6 (1979), in essence, makes it unlawful for
any underwriter or other person participating in a "distribution" to bid for or purchase any
units of the security being distributed, with certain specified exceptions. Chris-Craft alleged
that Bangor violated rule lOb-6 when it purchased stock from three large institutional inves-
tors while awaiting the effective date of the exchange offer. 430 U.S. at 9.
49. Id.
50. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 303 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Judge Tenney denied injunctive relief because Chris-Craft failed to carry the burden of
proving that it would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted. Id. at 199.
51. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Bangor Punta Corp., 426 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1970).
52. Id. at 570.
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injunction and sought only damages.53 The district court held that
Chris-Craft had standing to seek damages for Bangor's alleged vio-
lations of rule 10b-5, but ruled against Chris-Craft on the merits. 4
Therefore, the court found it unnecessary to decide whether a tender
offeror had standing to sue under section 14(e).11 The court felt that
its decision as to Chris-Craft's rule 10b-5 claims would be disposi-
tive on the merits of any claim brought under section 14(e) because
of the similar language in section 14(e) and rule 10b-5.55 On appeal,
the court of appeals unanimously held that Chris-Craft had stand-
ing to sue for damages under section 14(e).57 The court did not
address any claims made by Chris-Craft under rule 10b-5 because
it believed that section 14(e) was "the antifraud provision which
more appropriately provides the basis for [Chris-Craft's] standing
to sue. . . ,, 1 The court based its decision on the language of the
statute and prior case law.59 In reaching its decision, the court said:
We can conceive of no more effective means of furthering the general objec-
tive of section 14(e) than to grant a victim of violations of the statute stand-
ing to sue for damages . . . .Particularly in light of the enforcement ration-
ale of [J.I. Case v. Borak], we believe it is both necessary and appropriate
that [Chris-Craft] should be granted standing to sue for damages 0
The court of appeals remanded the case for the purpose of determin-
ing damages.' The district court awarded Chris-Craft damages in
the sum of $1,673,988.11 The court of appeals augmented this award
53. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 337 F. Supp. 1128, 1136 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
54. Id. at 1133.
55. Id. at 1134, 1140.
56. Id. See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
57. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 358 (2d Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 359.
59. Id. The court relied on the following cases: Electronic Speciality Co. v. Int'l. Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969); Butler Aviation Int'l, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers
Inc., 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970); Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075
(5th Cir. 1970); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (lst Cir.
1973); Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 909 (1970). See 480 F.2d at 360. See also notes 97-107 & 129-33 infra and accompany-
ing text for a discussion of these cases.
60. 480 F.2d at 361.
61. Id. at 379-80.
62. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 384 F. Supp. 507, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
The court determined that the reduction in appraisal value of Chris-Craft's holding in Piper
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to over thirty-five million dollars. 3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to deter-
mine whether a defeated tender offeror has an implied cause of
action for damages under section 14(e).14 The Court held that a
tender offeror, suing in its capacity as a takeover bidder, does not
have standing to sue for damages under section 14(e). 5 In reaching
its decision to deny standing under section 14(e) to a defeated
tender offeror, the Court extensively discussed the legislative his-
tory of the Williams Act."6 Relying on the statements of Senator
Williams and others, 7 the Court concluded that the Williams Act
was intended to protect the shareholders of the target corporation,
not the defeated tender offeror"5 The Court stated that its
"conclusion as to the legislative history is confirmed by the analysis
in Cort v. Ash. '"9 In Cort,70 Ash alleged that directors of Bethlehem
Steel Corporation had violated the Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971,"' a criminal statute prohibiting corporations from making
contributions or expenditures in connection with specified federal
elections. The district court denied Ash's request for a preliminary
injunction.72 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
attributable to Bangor becoming the majority shareholder was $2.40 per share. The court
multiplied the $2.40 by the number of shares held by Chris-Craft (697,495) to arrive at the
damages award.
63. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 516 F.2d 172, 190 (2d Cir. 1975). The
court held that "the correct formula for determining [Chris-Craft's] damages is the differ-
ence between the price [Chris-Craft] paid for its Piper stock ($63.98) and the price it could
have obtained for it through a public offering after [Bangor] unlawfully acquired control
($27.00). This results in damages of $36.98 per share, or a total of $25,793,365 for [Chris-
Craft's] block of 697,495 shares." Appr6ximately 10 million dollars in interest was added to
this figure, making the total award over 35 million dollars.
64. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 425 U.S. 910 (1976).
65. 430 U.S. at 42.
66. Id. at 22-37.
67. See text accompanying note 31 supra for a discussion of the remarks by Senator
Williams. The Court also relied upon the comments of Manuel Cohen, the then chairman of
the SEC. 430 U.S. at 27-28.
68. Id. at 35. It should be noted that the Court did not consider Chris-Craft an investor
even though it held stock in Piper. The Court reasoned that because Chris-Craft was the
tender offeror, it was not "in the posture of a target shareholder confronted with the deci-
sion of whether to tender or retain its stock." See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
69. 430 U.S. at 37.
70. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
71. See 2 U.S.C. § 441 (b) (1976) (current version).
72. 350 F. Supp. 227, 231 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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denial of the preliminary injunction but reversed the decision to
grant Ash summary judgment. 3 The Supreme Court refused to
imply a cause of action for Ash's derivative suit and stated that his
remedy, if any, must be under state law." In its opinion the Su-
preme Court set out the following four factors as relevant in deter-
mining whether a cause of action may be implied from a statute
which does not expressly provide for one:
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted" . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff?...
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . .
Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative
scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?...
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law,
in an area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappro-
priate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law? . . .
Addressing the first Cort factor, the Piper Court relied on state-
ments made in the congressional debates and reports,7" and deter-
mined that the tender offeror was not a member of the class "for
whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."" Instead, the
Court concluded that the tender offeror "was a member of the class
whose activities Congress intended to regulate.""8 Regarding the
second factor, the Court noted immediately that there was no evi-
dence of legislative intent to create or deny a remedy in favor of
tender offerors.79 However, the Court interpreted the legislative doc-
uments as evincing "the narrow intent to curb the unregulated ac-
tivities of tender offerors."I" In addition, the Court rejected the argu-
ment that section 14(e) extended standing to tender offerors because
it did not contain the "purchaser-seller" requirement.8 ' With regard
73. 496 F.2d 416, 421-22 (3d Cir. 1974).
74. 422 U.S. at 78.
75. Id. (citations omitted). It should be noted that the Court did not indicate whether
these four factors should be construed conjunctively or disjunctively. See note 123 infra and
accompanying text.
76. See text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
77. 430 U.S. at 37.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 38.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 38-39. The Court conceded that shareholder offerees who did not tender their
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to the third factor, the Court concluded that the granting of reme-
dial relief would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the
Williams Act.2 The Court reasoned that a judgment in favor of the
tender offeror would work a hardship on the shareholders who ex-
changed their stock for shares in the white knight by forcing them
to bear part of the burden of paying the damages award to the
defeated tender offeror. 3 The Court, applying the fourth factor,
determined that the matter was better relegated to state law, "at
least to the extent that the offeror seeks damages for having been
wrongfully denied a 'fair opportunity' to compete for control of an-
other corporation. '"84
The Court distinguished JI. Case Co. v. Borak"5 from the case at
bar." In Borak, a shareholder of J.I. Case brought suit alleging
deprivation of the pre-emptive rights of all shareholders by reason
of a merger between Case and American Tractor Company. The
shareholder claimed that Case Company had violated section 14(a)"7
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by issuing false and mislead-
ing proxy material. The trial court held that it could not grant
remedial relief in a private suit based on violations of section 14(a).
The court of appeals reversed."8 The Supreme Court affirmed and
stock due to fraudulent misrepresentation by a party might have standing under section 14(e)
because it does not contain the purchaser-seller requirement. But, the Court clearly stated
that the increased protection, if any, bestowed on shareholder offerees could not be inter-
preted as giving protection to tender offerors. Id. See notes 34-38 supra and accompanying
text.
82. 430 U.S. at 39.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 41. The Court offered little reasoning and authority to support its conclusion
that the damages cause of action was traditionally relegated to state law. In fact, the Court
acknowledged the "pervasiveness" of the federal securities law. It is possible that the court
reached the conclusion it did in order to avoid deciding whether the Cort factors should be
construed conjunctively or disjunctively. See notes 122-23 infra and accompanying text.
85. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
86. 430 U.S. at 41.
87. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities ex-
change or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors, to solicit or permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted security) registered
pursuant to section 12 of this title.
88. 317 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1963).
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implied a damages remedy under section 14(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 because it believed that such a remedy was
necessary to effectuate the legislative purpose of protecting inves-
tors ."
The Piper Court distinguished Borak by explaining that "creating
a damages action in favor of [the defeated tender offeror would be]
unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes in
adopting the Williams Act."90
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens stated that Borak, not
Cort, should have been the controlling authority." He believed that
the same factors which made Borak distinguishable from Cort were
present in Piper."2
In this case, as in Borak, there is "at least a statutory basis for inferring
that a civil cause of action of some sort lay in favor of someone;" . . . there
is a "pervasive legislative scheme governing the relationship between the
plaintiff class and the defendant class in a particular regard;" . . . the pri-
vate remedy is necessary to effectuate the congressional goal; ...and that
goal will accordingly be hindered if the plaintiff is relegated to an inadequate
state remedy."
Justice Stevens explained that the presence of these factors excused
the tender offeror from meeting the "especial class" test of Cort.'"
Justice Stevens also advanced a policy argument for finding an
implied cause of action for damages in favor of the tender offeror.
He reasoned that the high cost of complex litigation precludes most
individual investors from bringing suit; therefore, granting the
tender offeror standing to sue would provide the most effective det-
terent to the perpetration of fraud on shareholders. Justice Stevens
also pointed out that granting standing to a tender offeror would
89. 377 U.S. at 432.
90. 430 U.S. at 41.
91. Id. at 66 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that Borak was distinguished, -
not overruled, by Cort. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 79, 82, 85). It has been argued that Justice Stevens'
reasoning was sounder than that of the majority. The author concluded that because courts
recognized causes of action under sections 14(a) and 10(b), the sections after which section
14(e) is patterned (See 113 CONG. REC. 24665 (1967) (Remarks of Senator Williams)), Con-
gress probably intended to extend the same protection to tender offerors under the Williams
Act. Note, Chris-Craft: Changing Perspectives on Contests for Corporate Control, 6 HoFsTRA
L. REV. 203, 225 (1977).
94. 430 U.S. at 66-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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protect those shareholders of the target who accepted the exchange
offer and became shareholders of the tender offeror.95
IV. Law Prior To Piper
Prior to Piper, the federal courts liberally granted standing under
section 14(e). Indeed, courts seemed to follow the opinion of the
Borak Court that in controversies involving securities laws, courts
should not hesitate to imply a private right of action when to do so
would effectuate the purpose of the statute involved. 6 This position
is reflected in H.K. Porter, Inc. v. Nicholson Tile Co. 7 In Porter,
plaintiff made a tender offer to the stockholders of Nicholson to buy
437,000 shares. By the closing date of the offer, only 132,292 shares
were tendered. Plaintiff then brought an action for damages in dis-
trict court contending that Nicholson, in response to plaintiff's
tender offer, issued false, fraudulent and misleading statements in
order to persuade its shareholders not to tender their stock, in viola-
tion of rule 10b-5, section 10(b) and section 14(e) of the 1934 Securi-
ties Exchange Act. The district court dismissed the section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5 claims,"s but let stand the section 14(e) claim." The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed."" The court based
its decision to grant standing on the history of the Williams Act, the
reasoning expressed in Borak, and the argument that section 14(e)
was intended to expand the standing allowed under section 10(b)
and rule 10b-5.'0 The second'"2 and fifth" 3 circuits also have granted
standing to sue for damages under section 14(e).
The federal courts were even more liberal in granting standing to
sue for injunctive relief under section 14(e). In Butler Aviation In-
95. Id. at 68.
96. 377 U.S. at 432-34.
97. 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
98. 341 F. Supp. 508 (D.R.I. 1972).
99. 353 F. Supp. 153 (D.R.I. 1973) (supplemental opinion).
100. 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
101. Id. at 423-25.
102. Lowenschuss v. Kane, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975). (shareholder of target permitted
to sue tender offeror for damages resulting from the alleged breach of the tender offer con-
tract).
103. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing, 489 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1974), (court held that plaintiff




ternational, Inc. v. Comprehensive Designers, Inc.,'"'4 the target al-
leged that the tender offeror had violated section 14(e) by misstating
earnings in the annual report. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit expressly held that the target had standing to seek prelimi-
nary injunctive relief under section 14(e)."'1 In Mesa Petroleum Co.
v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., ,01 the district court implied a cause of action
under section 14(e) in favor of a tender offeror seeking to enjoin
target's management from interfering with the offeror's communica-
tion with target shareholders. Several other cases have noted, in
dicta, that preliminary injunctive relief may be granted to a party
suing under section 14(e).'17 Furthermore, in Electronic Specialty
Co. v. International Controls Corp.,'"7.' the Second Circuit granted
target management and non-tendering shareholders standing to
seek permanent injunctive relief.'0 72.
The Supreme Court, by holding in Piper that a tender offeror does
not have standing to sue for damages under section 14(e), did not
follow the trend in the lower federal courts to grant standing liber-
ally. The Piper decision settles the standing issue with respect to the
tender offeror's right to sue for damages. The tender offeror's right
to seek injunctive relief under section 14(e) will next be discussed.
V. Injunctive Relief
Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States directly ad-
104. 425 F.2d 842 (2d Cir. 1970).
105. Id. at 843n.1.
106. 406 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
107. After holding that the tender offeror had standing under rule 10b-5 to sue target for
injunctive relief under the "forced seller" principle, the court, in Crane Co. v..Westinghouse
Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 798-99 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970), said that
the enactment of section 14(e) would allow tender offeror to sue even if he did not have status
of a "forced seller." In Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970), a tender offeror brought an action under rule 10b-5
against target management for management's alleged fraudulent activity in resisting the
offer. The court, relying on the Birnbaum rule, dismissed the rule 10b-5 claims, but hinted
that standing might be afforded a tender offeror under section 14(e). Id. at 969-70. In
Electronic Speciality Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969), target and non-
tendering shareholders brought an action against the tender offeror for alleged violations
of sections 14(d) and (e) and rule 10b-5. Though the court could have avoided the standing
issue, id. at 945, it stated, in dicta, that the target and non-tendering shareholders could bring
an action for a preliminary injunction under section 14(e).
107.1. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
107.2. See notes 130-40 infra and accompanying text for further discussion of this case.
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dressed in Piper v. Chris-Craft the issue of a tender offeror's right
to sue for damages under section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange
Act, the nation's highest court has never decided whether a. tender
offeror has standing to seek injunctive relief under that section. In
fact, the Piper Court expressly noted that it was not ruling on the
standing question with respect to injunctive relief.'"8 Because the
effects of preliminary and permanent injunctions differ signifi-
cantly, each remedy will be analyzed separately.
A. Preliminary Injunction
If, during a tender offer contest, the tender offeror believes that
the white knight and/or target management have acted fraudu-
lently, the tender offeror should be granted standing under section
14(e) to seek an injunction ordering the white knight and/or target
management to disclose further information or to correct their mis-
representations. 0 Language from Piper supports this position. The
Piper Court stated that "injunctive relief at an earlier stage of the
contest is apt to be the most efficacious form of remedy" in cases
involving violations of section 14(e)."" In addition, the Piper Court
quoted with approval Judge Friendly's observation that "in corpo-
rate control contests the stage of preliminary injunctive relief,
rather than post-contest lawsuits, 'is the time when relief can best
be given.' ""'
Some of the Court's reasoning in Piper is irrelevant to the injunc-
tive relief question. The Court noted that if it granted standing to
the tender offeror, investors who exchanged their shares in the tar-
get corporation for stock in the competing tender offeror would be
forced to bear a part of the damages award."' The Court believed
that such a result would contravene the intended purpose of the
108. 430 U.S. at 47 n.33. Specifically, the Court said: "We intimate no view upon whether
as a general proposition a suit in equity for injunctive relief, as distinguished from an action
for damages, would lie in favor of a tender offeror under . . .§ 14(e) .... "
109. The tender offeror conceivably could seek injunctions designed to suspend the voting
rights of the shares acquired by the white knight or to prevent the white knight from acquiring
any more shares. See text accompanying note 129 infra for a discussion of these types of
injunctions.
110. 430 U.S. at 40 n.26.
111. Id. at 42 (citing Electronic Speciality Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947
(2d Cir. 1969)).
112. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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Williams Act to protect the investor." 3 This concern is irrelevant to
cases where injunctive relief is sought because the granting of such
remedy does not impose a similar financial burden on the sharehold-
ers of the competing tender offeror. '" 4
Applying the relevant factors test established in Cort v. Ash"' to
a case in which injunctive relief is sought produces an inconclusive
answer. The result of applying the first two Cort factors"' suggests
that the tender offeror should be denied standing to seek injunctive
relief under section 14(e). In Piper, the Supreme Court concluded
that investors, not tender offerors, made up the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted." 7 In addition, the Piper
Court indicated, in dicta, that even if the tender offeror asserted
standing as a shareholder of the target, he would not be considered
a member of the especial class."' The fact that the tender offeror
seeks injunctive relief, rather than damages, in no way impeaches
the validity of the Piper Court's conclusions in this area. Similarly,
the Piper Court's determination that there was no indication of
legislative intent to create a remedy in favor of the tender offeror"'
is equally valid in cases where injunctive relief is sought.
However, when the third Cort factor'20 is applied to a case where
injunctive relief is sought the result suggests that standing should
113. 430 U.S. at 39.
114. See Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468,
475-76 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See note 127 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
The court also believed that granting a tender offeror standing to sue for damages under
section 14(e) would deter some corporations from making competing tender offers for fear of
incurring great expense in defending suits brought by defeated tender offerors or target
management. 430 U.S. at 40. Though this concern arguably is applicable to the standing
question with respect to injunctive relief, on balance, it is insufficient to compel denial of
standing to a tender offeror.
115. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). For a detailed discussion of Cort, see notes 70-75 supra and
accompanying text.
116. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
117. 430 U.S. at 37. See text accompanying notes 76.78 supra.
118. The Court specifically stated:
As a tender offeror actively engaged in competing for [the target's] stock, [the
tender offeror] was not in the position of a target shareholder confronted with the
decision of whether to tender or retain its stock . . . [Tihe fact that [the tender
offerorl necessarily acquired [the target's] stock as a means of taking over [the
target] adds nothing to its § 14(e) standing arguments.
430 U.S. at 35-36.
119. Id. at 38-39. See text accompanying notes 75, 79 & 80 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
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be granted to the tender offeror. The issuance of a preliminary in-
junction is consistent with the underlying aim of the statute because
such a judgment does not affect adversely any investor and ensures
that investors will receive complete and accurate information upon
which to base their investment decisions.' Similarly, the result of
applying the fourth Cort factor to an action where injunctive relief
is requested demands that a cause of action be implied in favor of
the tender offeror. In light of the pervasiveness of the federal secu-
rities law, this cause of action cannot be found to be one tradition-
ally relegated to state law. 2'
Because the application of the Cort factors to a case where injunc-
tive relief is sought yields an equivocal answer, the ultimate decision
of whether to imply a cause of action rests on a determination of
whether the factors should be construed conjunctively or disjunc-
tively. The Cort Court did not specify how the factors should be
construed.'23 In Piper, the Court was not forced to give its opinion
as to how the factors should be construed because the Cort test
produced an unequivocal answer. It appears that the district courts
have reduced the determination of whether a cause of action should
be implied in favor of a tender offeror seeking injunctive relief to a
function of one factor: whether implying a cause of action would be
inconsistent with the underlying legislative purpose. In Humana,
Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc.,"'2 the court granted a tender offeror
standing to sue a competing tender offeror for injunctive relief under
section 14(e). Plaintiff sought increased information about the com-
petitor's offer and the nature of its stock to enable the offerees to
121. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
122. The fact that the Piper Court offered little reasoning and case law to support its
conclusion that the damages cause of action was traditionally relegated to state law and the
fact that it acknowledged the pervasiveness of the federal securities law casts doubt on the
propriety of its conclusion. See note 84 supra and the accompanying text.
123. The Cort Court listed the factors in four sentences. The Court did not use the
conjunctions "and" or "or" in laying out the factors. See text accompanying note 75 supra.
124. 445 F. Supp. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Humana, the plaintiff sought to acquire 75%
of American Medicorp stock. Medicorp's board of directors decided that the offer was not
advantageous for its shareholders and advised them not to tender their stock. Two months
later Trans World Airlines and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Hilton International Company,
made a competing tender offer for Medicorp stock. While both offers were still open, the
plaintiff amended its complaint to include TWA and Hilton and to request injunctive relief
against both. The court, admitting that because of urgency the issue was not thoroughly
analyzed, held that the plaintiff-tender offeror had standing under section 14(e) to sue for
injunctive relief and granted the amendment of the second complaint.
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make an informed judgment. 5 In reaching its decision, the court
stated that "the critical factor is not whether Humana may be bene-
fited by the suit but whether the stockholders of the target company
would be benefited if the allegations of the complaint are proven to
be true and the relief requested is granted."'26 The reasoning em-
ployed in Humana was accepted by the court in Weeks Dredging
and Contracting, Inc. v. American Dredging Co.,' 7 a case in which
a tender offeror was permitted to sue the target corporation for
injunctive relief under section 14(e).
Notably, the Cort test was not applied in Humana or Weeks. The
only case which discusses the Cort relevant factor test is Foremost
-McKesson, Inc. v. Posner.2' In Foremost-McKesson, the court
held that the target management had the right to seek a preliminary
injunction against a tender offeror under section 14(e) even though
it found that the target management was not a member of the
especial class and despite the Supreme Court's conclusion in Piper
that the statute was designed to protect only investors.
The conclusions of the lower courts are sound, even though their
opinions fail to apply strictly the Piper analysis. It is immaterial
that the party bringing the suit is not of the especial class or that
there is no indication of legislative intent to create a remedy in favor
of the tender offeror as long as members of the especial class are
benefited by the action. Therefore, a tender offeror should be af-
forded standing under section 14(e) to seek an injunction which
would require the adversary to reveal further information or correct
125. Id. at 616.
126. Id. In moving toward the ultimate articulation of this test, the court relied heavily
on Judge Friendly's observation in Electronic Specialty (see note 111 supra and accompany-
ing text) and Chief Justice Warren Burger's statement in Piper (see note 110 supra and
accompanying text). The court distinguished Piper and Crane Co. v. American Standard,
Inc., 439 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), which was relied upon by the defendant, on the fact
that these cases involved actions for damages.
127. 451 F. Supp. 468, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1978). In this case Weeks Dredging and Contracting
(Weeks) attempted to take over American Dredging Company (American) by directing a
tender offer to the American shareholders. American, in an effort to resist the takeover, made
statements concerning the offer to the press and to the shareholders. Weeks then brought an
action for preliminary injunctive relief against American in which Weeks alleged that Ameri-
can's statements to the press and shareholders were false and misleading and thereby violated
section 14(e). The court found that the tender offeror had standing to seek preliminary
injunctive relief under section 14(e) and granted the relief requested.
128. No. 76-338 (N.D. Cal., filed April 20, 1977).
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previous disclosures because the investors are the direct beneficiar-
ies of the action.
The tender offeror, however, may seek other types of preliminary
injunctions.'29 For example, the tender offeror may want to enjoin
the white knight from soliciting or acquiring any more shares during
the pendency of the suit, or from exercising voting rights attached
to those shares. Tender offerors should be granted standing to sue
for such injunctions because such injunctions ultimately protect the
investors, a result desired by the Williams Act. The effect of such
injunctions is to maintain the status quo while the court determines
whether the white knight or the target management indeed has
violated section 14(e). The investor is not harmed by the imposition
of such injunction; he need only postpone the tendering of his stock
until the court makes its decision. These injunctions protect the
investor by giving him the benefit of the court's ruling before he is
forced to decide whether or not to tender his shares.
B. Permanent Injunction
A tender offeror injured by the fraudulent activity of the white
knight may attempt to permanently enjoin the white knight from
acquiring any more stock in the target. Alternatively, the tender
offeror may attempt to enjoin the white knight from voting any of
the shares it acquired or to have the white knight divest itself from
the stock it already acquired. To date no court has addressed the
issue of whether a tender offeror may sue for permanent injunctive
relief. Target management's standing to seek permanent injunc-
tions, however, has been discussed in several cases.
In Electronic Specialty Company v. International Controls Cor-
poration,3 0 a case decided prior to Piper, target management and
a non-tendering shareholder, alleging that the tender offeror
violated, inter alia, section 14(e) by misstating material information
concerning the tender offer, sought to force the tender offeror to
divest itself of the stock it acquired in the target and to refrain from
voting the stock. The Second Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs had
standing to seek the permanent injunction on the grounds that
granting standing would best effectuate the legislative purpose of
129. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. Int'l Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969).
130. 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).
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the Williams Act.'3 ' The court, however, denied plaintiff's request
for relief on the merits.'32 The court reasoned that if the tender
offeror were forced to divest the shares it acquired the price of the
target's stock would be driven down, thereby injuring the non-
tendering shareholders. Similarly, the court refused to order the
tender offeror to relinquish its voting rights because it felt that
such a disposition would have the same effect as a divestiture
order. The court also noted that requiring the tender offeror to re-
frain from voting the shares would leave the direction of the com-
pany to less than fifty per cent of the stock, an "unhealthy" situa-
tion. 3 The relevance today of Electronic Specialty may be limited.
First, because Electronic Specialty was decided prior to Piper, the
methodology formulated therein was not applied. Second, and
more important, the reason espoused in Electronic Specialty for
denying the requested relief was cited later in Piper as a factor
relevant to the determination of whether to grant standing.
In Becton Dickinson and Company v. Sun Company, Inc., ' " a
case consolidating SEC and private actions, the defendants pur-
chased, over several days, thirty-four percent of the target com-
pany's outstanding stock. Defendants, in response to allegations
that they had violated, inter alia, section 14(e), argued that the
target lacked standing because it was not an intended beneficiary
of the Williams Act. The district court held that under these cir-
cumstances target management has the right to sue for post-
acquisition equitable relief. "5 In reaching its decision to grant stand-
ing the court emphasized that the effect of a preliminary injunction
was negatived by the defendants' secret and rapid takeover. The
court explained that denying the target standing would, in effect,
allow a tender offeror implementing "quick strike" tactics to de-
prive the target a meaningful remedy.' 36
131. Id. at 946. The district court granted standing by analogizing section 14(e) to the
proxy rules established under section 14(a). Section 14(a) makes it unlawful to solicit proxies
in contravention of the rules and regulations promulgated by the SEC. Section 14(a) is set
forth in note 87 supra. See Studebaker Corp. v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966). The
circuit court noted that the analogy to section 14(a) was not perfect, and therefore refused to
rest its decision solely on that basis.
132. 409 F.2d at 947.
133. Id. at 947-48.
134. 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
135. Id. at 816.
136. Id. at 817.
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The precise effect of Becton Dickinson on the question of whether
target management may sue for permanent injunctive relief under
section 14(e) is unclear. Though Becton Dickinson was decided after
Piper, the case did not discuss the methodology set forth therein.
Furthermore, there is language in Becton Dickinson which suggests
that target management may be granted standing only when the
tender offeror's tactics render meaningless the imposition of a pre-
liminary injunction.'37 For these reasons, it appears that Becton
Dickinson does not stand for the bioad proposition that target man-
agement has standing under section 14(e) to sue for permanent
injunctive relief.
In both Electronic Specialty and Becton Dickinson, target man-
agement initiated the suit for permanent injunctive relief. Whether
these cases may be used to support a finding that the tender offeror
has standing to sue for permanent injunctive relief is subject to
speculation. The intent of the drafters of the Williams Act was to
benefit only investors. 38 Although target management has been
granted standing in several cases, it does not necessarily follow that
a tender offeror should be granted standing because the relationship
between the tender offeror and the investors is significantly different
from the relationship between target management and the inves-
tors. 3 As noted in Electronic Specialty, target management, ob-
stensibly at least, is in the position of representing the shareholders'
interest whereas the tender offeror is not. 140
The case of Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc.,"' in
which a tender offeror was granted standing to sue for a prelimi-
nary injunction, provides no compelling reasons for ruling that a
tender offeror may seek permanent injunctive relief under section
14(e). The effect of granting tender offerors standing to sue for
permanent injunctive relief is more similar to allowing the tender
137. Id.
138. See notes 29-33 supra and accompanying text.
139. As noted in the text accompanying note 29 supra, the drafters of the Williams Act
did not intend to favor target management over the tender offeror. Strictly construed, this
intention implies that the target management and the tender offeror should be treated
equally, i.e., if the target management is granted standing, so should the tender offeror. For
reasons discussed later, this conclusion should not be drawn.
140. Shareholders are afforded state causes of action in order to protect them against
management's abuse of its representative position. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine
& Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291, 51 A.L.R.2d 860 (1955).
141. See notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this case.
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offeror to sue for damages than for preliminary injunctive relief
because the imposition of a permanent injunction will inflict a
financial burden on shareholders."2 Therefore, if protection of the
investor is the paramount consideration, the rationale of Piper
should be followed and the tender offeror should not be granted
standing under section 14(e) to sue for permanent injunctive relief.
VI. Conclusion
In Piper v. Chris-Craft, the United States Supreme Court refused
to imply a cause of action under section 14(e) in favor of a tender
offeror suing for damages. The Court, however, expressly left open
the question of whether a tender offeror has standing to sue for
injunctive relief under section 14(e). In.Piper, the Court established
the methodology for determining whether a cause of action should
be implied under a certain statute. As part of its analysis, the Piper
Court applied the facts of its case to the "relevant factors" test
established in Cort v. Ash. The district courts which have addressed
the standing question with respect to injunctive relief have based
their decisions, in effect, on one factor: whether implying a cause
of action would be inconsistent with the underlying legislative pur-
pose.
A tender offeror should have standing to seek preliminary injunc-
tive relief because investors are the ultimate beneficiaries of the
action; they will be assured of complete and accurate information
as a result of the suit. In contrast, implying a cause of action in favor
of a tender offeror seeking permanent injunctive relief does not serve
the investors' best interests, and therefore should be denied.
James A. Scaduto
142. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
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